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Abstract
We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a
decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent’s information
acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nev-
ertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision
maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the num-
ber of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion
is impossible if the agent’s stakes are too high.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies a situation in which an agent tries to persuade a decision maker to
choose his preferred action by means of argumentation. We view arguments as verifiable
signals that are imperfectly informative about a decision-relevant state of the world.
We explore the effect of the agent’s strategic behavior on the value of his arguments
for the decision maker, and we illustrate how the decision maker can extract valuable
information from the agent.
To highlight the key properties of argumentation, consider the following examples.
(A) A lobby of car manufacturers wants to prevent stricter emission standards. The
policy maker wants to impose stricter regulation if it is technologically and eco-
nomically feasible to meet the standard, but refrain from stricter regulation oth-
erwise. The lobby argues: “There is an upward trend in average size and weight
of car drivers. Moving a larger mass and simultaneously reducing emissions is not
feasible.”1
(B) A girl wants to go out to a party. Her parents want to allow her to go only if the
party is at a safe place. The girl argues: “Ann and Susan are allowed to go.”
These arguments are not cheap talk, as their content is verifiable. They suggest that
the respective state is the one in which sender and receiver agree about the appropriate
course of action. However, the evidence that is provided is imperfect. In Example A,
the weight of the driver makes up only a part of the weight that the car has to move. In
Example B, Ann’s and Susan’s parents’ decisions only reveal that they think the party
is at a reasonably safe place, but not how sure they are about this assessment.
The acquisition of arguments, in particular the process of thinking, occurs in pri-
vate. Hence, unfavorable arguments can be concealed. The policy maker in Example A
may reasonably assume that the lobby has conducted additional research with potential
relevance for predicting emissions, and the girl’s parents in Example B may reasonably
assume that her daughter has asked several other friends if they are allowed to go to the
party. If the decision maker believes that the agent may have intensively searched for
arguments, she should be skeptical if the results of such efforts are not presented. As
the decision maker cannot observe the agent’s evidence acquisition efforts, the evidence
1An argument of this kind has been brought forward by the ACEA in its answer to the European
Commission’s consultation on CO2 emission standards in 2007, which is available at the commission’s
web page: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/0001/organisations/acea_en.pdf.
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that the agent brings forward may not be persuasive though taken at face value it could
be.
The process of thinking typically does not immediately stop if the agent does not
find a favorable argument at his first attempt. Rather, the incentive to continue or to
stop the search for arguments depends on the evidence already collected. The value of
the agent’s arguments for the decision maker is affected by (i) repeated private attempts
to find favorable arguments, (ii) selective revelation of the results, and (iii) a history-
dependent decision to stop the search for arguments.
In our model, the agent obtains arguments by running experiments. Examples for
experiments in the sense in which the word is used in this paper are the development
of a theoretical model, a regression analysis, drawing a random sample, or the agent’s
exploration of his knowledge base as in Aragones et al. (2005). An argument can be
deductive, i.e., a logical inference from a set of assumptions, or inductive, i.e., a reason
supporting the probable truth. It is in the nature of arguments that they are imperfectly
informative. A deductive argument is valid only within a set of restrictive assumptions
that are an imperfect description of reality. The imperfection of inductive arguments
is evident. We therefore assume that an experiment is subject to both types of errors,
false positives and false negatives. An experiment may yield a favorable argument in a
state in which it is not in the decision maker’s best interest to choose the agent’s favorite
action.2 It may as well yield an unfavorable argument in a state in which the decision
maker and the agent in fact agree.3 By running experiments, the agent learns about the
state of the world.
The question that this paper explores is whether it is possible to persuade a Bayesian
decision maker given that the agent acquires and reveals his arguments strategically. We
show that the agent can persuade her by bringing forward a sufficiently large number of
arguments. If a large number of arguments is needed to persuade the decision maker,
this deters experimentation in the state in which the decision maker and the agent
disagree, where it is less likely that an experiment yields a favorable argument. As the
agent learns from previous failed experiments, he stops experimentation unsuccessfully
when his interim belief becomes too pessimistic. Therewith, experimentation obtains an
informational value: The fact that the agent acquired the number of arguments needed
to be persuasive is in fact persuasive.
The value of an argument depends on the stakes of the speaker. An interested party
2Ann’s and Susan’s parents may be mistaken in their judgement of the safety of the place.
3The total weight of a car may decline and still it may be infeasible to reach the emission standard.
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with larger stakes or lower cost of experimentation has to provide more arguments in
order to be persuasive. We apply our model to the interaction between a researcher and
an editor, in which the former tries to persuade the latter to publish his work, and we
extend our model in two directions. First, we study a symmetric version of the problem.
A special feature of this application is that the decision maker may be persuaded to
choose the agent’s favorite action (to publish his paper) if she is sufficiently convinced
that the paper’s proposition is true, independently of the state of the world that the
proposition indicates. In such a problem, it is unambiguously beneficial for the decision
maker if the agent has strong incentives for experimentation. Second, in the context of
our application, it is reasonable to assume that the number of arguments that can be
transmitted to the editor is limited. In this case, if the researcher’s stakes are high or
the cost of experimenting is low, persuasion is impossible. The existence of a bound on
the number of transmittable arguments can rationalize restrictive scientific standards,
and it may trigger a barrier to new, objectively superior, methods.
2 Related literature
Our model relates to the literature on strategic experimentation, where the basic un-
derlying trade-off is between benefits from exploration and benefits from exploitation,
as in Rothschild (1974), Aghion et al. (1991), Bolton and Harris (1999), Keller et al.
(2005) and Rosenberg et al. (2007).4 Similar to these bandit problems the agent here
dynamically updates his belief about an exogenous state. At the same time our model
belongs to the class of persuasion games (e.g., Jovanovich, 1982, Milgrom and Roberts
1986, Glazer and Rubinstein 2001, 2004, 2006, Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) in which
the production of evidence is endogenous (e.g., Milgrom 2008). Papers that share fea-
tures of both strands of the literature and that are closely related to our work are Celik
(2003), Brocas and Carillo (2007) and Henry (2009).
Brocas and Carillo (2007) illustrate how an interested party can exert influence by
controlling a flow of public experiments.5 They also consider a case in which exper-
imentation is private, the agent sends a report about his posterior, and the report is
verifiable. In this setting, skeptical beliefs à la Milgrom and Roberts (1986) induce un-
raveling, and the same information is available to the decision maker as under public
4For a survey see Bergemann and Välimäki (2008).
5Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) study competing interested parties who provide a flow of public exper-
iments. Felgenhauer and Loerke (2014) build on the present framework and compare sequential public
and private experimentation, but with an endogenous precision of the experiments.
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experimentation. Henry (2009) studies private experimentation in a framework in which
the interested party ex ante chooses how much to invest in experimentation. Again an
unraveling argument applies and the agent’s report is fully revealing as the decision
maker in equilibrium deduces the optimal amount of experimentation. The assump-
tion that the agent is not able to adjust his decision to continue experimenting in the
experimentation phase is central for the result. In our paper the decision to continue
experimenting is history-dependent. As information acquisition occurs in private, this
is a natural assumption. In such a framework the decision maker can only anticipate
the optimal experimentation plan but not the actual number of experiments conducted.
The decision maker’s beliefs are not always degenerate such that skeptical beliefs are
not always helpful and there is no unraveling. In a similar setting, but with a continu-
ous action space for the decision maker and a Poisson evidence production technology,
Celik (2003) shows that no productive fully revealing equilibrium exists if the agent is
ex ante uninformed about the state. A feature of his evidence production technology
is that the agent’s interim belief evolves continuously between two experimental suc-
cesses, which occur randomly in time. Hence, it is impossible for the decision maker to
perfectly deduce the agent’s posterior from the presented evidence. In our model, the
decision maker’s action space is binary and evidence production is modeled as a series
of Bernoulli trials. Persuasion is possible, but in general communication is not fully
revealing. Only if the presentation of a single successful experiment suffices to persuade
the decision maker and a single failure deters further experimentation can the decision
maker deduce the agent’s posterior perfectly.
Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004, 2006) analyze debates, assuming that the de-
baters are endowed with hard evidence and that they can only report a subset of their
evidence. If a debater cannot respond “appropriately” to his opponent’s argument, then
this suggests that his overall endowment of evidence is unfavorable. As a consequence,
evidence of the same quality (but different endogenous “appropriateness”) may have a
different value. In our paper instead, information acquisition is endogenous and we find
that exactly the same hard evidence (and not only evidence of the same quality) may
have a different value depending on who presents the evidence.
The agent’s reporting space in our model is similar to that in Dzuida (2011). In
Dzuida’s paper, a pool of arguments is exogenously given to the agent, but the decision
maker does not know how many arguments the agent has. Like in our paper, in order
to persuade the decision maker, the agent has to provide a sufficiently high number of
arguments in his favor. Dzuida shows that an opportunistic agent also reveals coun-
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terarguments, but these are ignored by the decision maker when updating about the
state. Two-sided argumentation is triggered by the incentive to pool with an honest
type.6 In the context of our model, an equilibrium with two-sided argumentation is
either Pareto-inferior or payoff equivalent to an equilibrium in which counterarguments
are not revealed.
Our work also relates to the literature on informational lobbying with evidence that
is to some extent hard (e.g., Austen-Smith, 1994). Related to our specific application,
there is an economic literature on academic research, e.g., Lewis and Ottaviani (2008),
Olszewski and Sandroni (2011), Aghion et al. (2008) and Stern (2004). To the literature
on the philosophy of science, e.g., Popper (1959) and Kuhn (1970), we add a rational-
ization of argumentation within a restrictive framework and of a possible barrier to new
methods.
3 Model
We model information transmission from an interested agent to a decision maker with
state-dependent preferences. There are two ex ante equally likely states of the world,
s ∈ {0, 1}. The decision maker has the choice between two actions, x ∈ {0, 1}. The
decision maker’s utility is
u(x, s) s = 1 s = 0
x = 1 0 −pd
x = 0 −(1− pd) 0
with pd > 1/2. We call pd the decision maker’s “threshold of doubt”.7 She maximizes
her expected utility and prefers x = 1 if the probability that s = 1 passes her threshold
of doubt, and x = 0 otherwise. The agent prefers x = 1 regardless of the state of the
world. In case x = 1, the agent’s gross utility is U > 0 and otherwise it is 0. The agent
maximizes expected gross utility minus the expected cost of experimentation. The agent
and the decision maker hold the same prior belief about s.
The agent has access to an experimentation technology which can generate signals
yi, yi ∈ {0, 1}. He can conduct as many experiments as he wants. Conditional on the
6In a setting with uncertainty about the agent’s preferences and about his information endowment,
and with an exogenous limit on the number of arguments that can be transmitted, Le Quement (2012)
shows that the agent can use counter-arguments to signal a large (exogenous) endowment with signals.
7A similar formulation of preferences is used in the literature on committee decision making (e.g.,
Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998).
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state, experimental outcomes are drawn independently. We assume prob{yi = s′|s =
s′} = p, p ∈ (1/2, 1). If yi = 1, experiment i yields an argument (or evidence) in favor
of the agent, whereas yi = 0 is an argument against him. He can neither manipulate nor
invent experimental outcomes. In that sense, yi is “hard” information.8 However, the
agent can conceal experimental outcomes and he cannot prove that he did not conduct
a particular experiment. Each experiment costs c. Unless stated otherwise, we assume
c > 0. Let yt denote the outcome of the tth experiment. Denote with ht = (y1, . . . , yt)
the experimentation history after the first t experiments. The number of conducted
experiments cannot be observed by the decision maker. Denote with n0(ht) the number
of experiments with outcome 0 and with n1(ht) the number of experiments with outcome
1 after the tth experiment. Note that n0(ht)+n1(ht) = t. Hence, (n0, n1), with obvious
notation, summarizes all relevant information in a history ht.
After each experiment, the agent updates his assessment of the probability distri-
butions regarding the state of the world and future experimental outcomes and decides
whether to continue or to stop experimenting.
The experimentation phase is modeled as a time interval. If the agent conducts an
experiment at any given point in time, then he may still carry out as many experiments
as desired before the experimentation phase ends. Therewith, we exclude the possibility
of inferring information from the length of the experimentation phase.9 After the ex-
perimentation phase the agent publishes a report. Finally, the decision maker observes
the announcement and chooses x.
A strategy for the agent consists of an experimentation plan and an announcement
plan. For each possible experimentation history ht, the strategy specifies whether to
continue or to stop experimenting and, in the case of stopping, what (if anything) to re-
veal to the decision maker. Any announcement available to the agent can be summarized
by n̂ = (n̂0, n̂1), where n̂0 and n̂1 are the numbers of the announced unfavorable and
favorable results, respectively. The case that the agent does not make any announce-
ment is captured by n̂ = (0, 0). He cannot manipulate experimental outcomes nor invent
arguments. Hence, if the agent stops experimenting after t experiments, then the an-
nouncement has to satisfy n̂0 ≤ n0(ht) and n̂1 ≤ n1(ht). A strategy for the decision
maker is to choose x ∈ {0, 1} for each possible n̂. In equilibrium, players’ strategies are
8An argument, e.g., as a logical inference from a set of assumptions, cannot be manipulated.
9If the decision maker can deduce something from the time elapsed until he receives information,
a longer period suggests many failed experiments (see Hopenhayn and Squintani, 2011, in a different
context). Our model abstracts from these issues. In many situations experiments may differ with
respect to the time they require until completed and deducing failure from the time elapsed is difficult.
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sequentially rational and players update their beliefs according to Bayes’ Law whenever
possible.
4 Equilibrium analysis
We start our analysis with an introduction of our notion of equilibrium standards of
evidence. Then, we derive the agent’s optimal experimentation plan and subsequently
turn to the persuasiveness of the agent’s announcements. The proofs of our statements
can be found in the appendix.
4.1 Decision rule
The decision maker chooses x = 1 if and only if the probability that this is the correct





1, if prob{s = 1| n̂} ≥ pd
0, if prob{s = 1| n̂} < pd.
The above decision rule maximizes her expected utility, taking into account all the
information available to her. She forms beliefs regarding the experimental outcomes hid-
den from her according to the agent’s presumed strategy, applying Bayes’ Law whenever
possible. Upon observing an event which occurs with probability zero in equilibrium,
arbitrary beliefs are allowed. Ex ante, we have prob{s = 1} = 1/2 < pd. Without access
to additional information, the decision maker chooses x = 0. If she is confronted with an
announcement n̂, the decision maker takes into account the agent’s experimentation and
announcement strategy when assessing the informational value of n̂. An announcement
n̂ has an informational value if the decision maker’s posterior prob{s = 1|n̂} is different
from her prior 12 . The informational value of an announcement n̂ is the higher, the
larger |prob{s = 1|n̂}− 12 |.
There is a class of equilibria in which the decision maker always chooses x = 0.
She may, e.g., believe that for any argument in favor of the agent that he reveals, he
hides an argument against him. Thus, prob{s = 1| n̂} ≤ 1/2 for all n̂. As the decision
maker cannot be persuaded to choose x = 1, there is no point for the agent to collect
(costly) evidence. Hence, all announcements n̂ ̸= (0, 0) are out-of-equilibrium-events
and the decision maker’s beliefs are consistent. Note that there are many other out-of-
equilibrium-beliefs which support this equilibrium behavior.10
10This class of equilibria is similar to the “babbling”-equilibria in cheap talk games. There, the decision
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We are interested in equilibria in which the decision maker can sometimes be per-
suaded to choose in favor of the agent.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a persuasion equilibrium if x∗ = 1 for at least one
announcement n̂ that is announced with positive probability.
Due to the power that out-of-equilibrium-beliefs have in this game, multiple persua-
sion equilibria may exist.






1, if n̂0 = 0, n̂1 ≥ n∗
0, else.
(1)
is an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗.
In the following we refer to n∗ as the “standard of evidence”, and we restrict attention
to the class of equilibria with a standard of evidence n∗. We consider this class of
equilibria as particularly relevant because the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 (i) Any persuasion equilibrium coexists with a payoff-equivalent or Pareto-
dominant equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗.
(ii) If an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗ exists, it Pareto-dominates any
equilibrium in which the decision maker always chooses x = 0.
Focussing on the class of equilibria with a standard of evidence n∗ allows us to
identify an equilibrium with a single number n∗. That way, we avoid case distinctions
in the proofs and qualifications in our statements. Note that the restriction to the
announcement n̂0 = 0 is harmless because it is available to the agent for any information
endowment.
4.2 Optimal experimentation
Assume that the decision maker applies decision rule (1), and note that it is optimal for
the agent to release all favorable arguments and to conceal all unfavorable arguments
maker believes that the agent sends the same message for any possible information endowment (giving
the sender no incentive to do otherwise). Observing a message off the equilibrium path, the decision
maker thinks that the message is not informative. Here, off the equilibrium path the decision maker
believes that the agent has searched too often and thus any hard evidence announced does not contain
sufficient information.
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that he has acquired. The agent’s experimentation strategy maps all possible histories
of experimentation outcomes ht into either of the two actions “stop experimenting”
or “continue experimenting”. His optimal experimentation plan can be characterized
by two sets of experimentation histories that occur with positive probability on the
equilibrium path, a set Hs(n∗) of histories that yield persuasive evidence, and a set
Hf (n∗) of histories after which experimentation is stopped unsuccessfully.11 For each
element ht of Hs(n∗) and Hf (n∗) it is optimal to continue experimenting after each
sub-history of ht.12 Conditional on having acquired a certain number of favorable and
adverse outcomes, the sequence of experimental outcomes does not matter for the agent’s
continuation decision. The relevant information at ht can be summarized by the number
of unsuccessful and successful experiments (n0, n1).
Denote with vn∗(n0, n1) the continuation value when the agent is endowed with a
stock of experimental evidence (n0, n1). The continuation value is the maximum of
vsn∗(n
0, n1) and vcn∗(n
0, n1), which denote the agent’s continuation value when stopping
and when continuing experimentation, respectively.
If n1 ≥ n∗, the decision maker can be successfully persuaded. Further experimenta-
tion is costly and does not yield a benefit. It is optimal for the agent to stop experiment-
ing at ht if n1 = n∗. ht ∈ Hs(n∗) if it is optimal for the agent to continue experimenting
for each sub-history of ht.
Consider (n0, n1) with n1 < n∗. As the acquired evidence does not persuade the
decision maker, the agent’s continuation utility when stopping experimentation is zero
at such an experimentation history. Continuing experimentation yields continuation
utility
vcn∗(n
0, n1) = β(n0, n1)vn∗(n
0, n1 + 1) + (1− β(n0, n1))vn∗(n
0 + 1, n1)− c,
where β(n0, n1) = γ(n0, n1)p + (1 − γ(n0, n1))(1 − p) denotes the probability that the
next experiment yields a favorable outcome given the experimental evidence (n0, n1),




0, n1) < 0 at ht, it is
optimal for the agent to stop experimenting. ht ∈ Hf (n∗) if it is optimal for the agent
to continue experimenting for each sub-history of ht.
The agent’s incentive to continue experimenting depends only on the number of
arguments still to be acquired, n∗−n1, and his assessment of the probability distribution
11If it is optimal for the agent not to start experimenting, i.e., Hs(n∗) = ∅, Hf (n∗) contains the
“history” at which the experimentation phase starts, i.e., Hf (n∗) ̸= ∅.
12The set of sub-histories of some history ht contains the empty history and the sequences of experi-
mental outcomes in ht up to the ξth experiment, ξ = 1, . . . , t− 1.
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of experimental outcomes, which is determined by the “net evidence”, n1 − n0. If both
are the same at any two histories in any two equilibria, the agent’s continuation utility
is the same, i.e., vcn∗+1(n
0 + 1, n1 + 1) = vcn∗(n
0, n1).
Ceteris paribus, the more evidence the agent has to collect to meet the decision
maker’s standard of evidence, the lower is the continuation value as expected experi-
mentation costs increase, i.e., vcn∗+1(n
0, n1) < vcn∗(n
0, n1).
If an experiment succeeds, the number of arguments still to be acquired to persuade
the decision maker decreases, and the probability that an experiment yields a favor-
able argument increases. Hence, the agent’s experimentation incentives improve after a
successful experiment, i.e., vcn∗(n
0, n1 + 1) > vcn∗(n
0, n1).
If an experiment fails, the probability that future experiments succeed decreases, and
the expected number of experiments yet to be conducted in order to be able to persuade
the decision maker increases. As a consequence, continuing experimentation becomes
less attractive the more experiments already failed, i.e., vcn∗(n
0 + 1, n1) < vcn∗(n
0, n1).
In particular, for each stock of favorable arguments n1, there exists ñ(n1) (possibly
infinity) so that the agent continues the search upon observing a sequence of unfavorable
outcomes if and only if n0 < ñ(n1). ñ(n1) is weakly higher in the stock of successful
experimental outcomes.
The number of experiments to be conducted to meet the standard of evidence follows
a negative binomial distribution with success probability p in state s = 1 and success
probability 1 − p in state s = 0. The expected number of experiments to meet the
standard of evidence given interim belief γ(n0, n1), is (1−2p)γ(n
0,n1)+p
p(1−p) (n
∗ − n1). Hence,
the continuation value of continuing experimentation given a stock of arguments (n0, n1)
is at least U − n
∗
−n1
1−p c, the expected utility associated with continuing the evidence
acquisition until the standard of evidence is met if the agent is sure that s = 0, i.e.
γ(·) = 0.
We summarize our findings in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider n1 < n∗. (i) vcn∗+1(n
0+1, n1+1) = vcn∗(n
0, n1). (ii) vcn∗+1(n
0, n1) <
vcn∗(n
0, n1). (iii) vcn∗(n
0, n1 + 1) > vcn∗(n
0, n1). (iv) vcn∗(n
0 + 1, n1) < vcn∗(n
0, n1). (v)
vcn∗(n




Part (v) of the lemma states a lower bound for the value of continuing experimenta-
tion. Note that as soon as the agent has obtained n1 ≥ n∗− (1−p)Uc favorable arguments,
he stops experimentation only when he meets the standard of evidence. On the other
hand, for any (n0, n1) with n1 < n∗ − (1−p)Uc , there exists a n
′ such that if the next n′
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experimental outcomes are unfavorable, then the continuation value from experimenting
drops below zero and the agent stops experimentation unsuccessfully.
Resolving indifference in favor of continuing experimentation, the optimal experi-
mentation plan induced by a decision rule with a standard of evidence n∗ is unique.
As the agent stops experimenting only when he meets the standard of evidence if
n1 ≥ n∗ − (1−p)U
c
, we have Hf (n∗) = ∅ for n∗ ≤
(1−p)U
c
. If n∗ > (1−p)U
c
, we have
Hf (n∗) ̸= ∅.
The plan to unconditionally continue experimentation until the agent meets the
standard of evidence defines a lower bound for the expected utility from engaging in
experimentation: vc(0, 0) ≥ U − n
∗
2p(1−p)c. Hence, a sufficient condition for Hs(n
∗) ̸= ∅
is n∗ ≤ 2p(1−p)U
c
.
In the Appendix we describe an algorithm to determine the optimal experimentation
plan on the equilibrium path, and the associated sets Hs(n∗) and Hf (n∗) for a standard
of evidence n∗.
4.3 Persuasiveness
The statement n̂ = (0, n∗) has an informational value if and only if neither Hf (n∗) nor
Hs(n∗) are empty. In this case the decision maker can rule out some experimentation
histories upon the observation of n̂ = (0, n∗). Histories for which the agent optimally
stops experimenting without meeting the standard of evidence are more likely to occur
if s = 0 than if s = 1. If Hf (n∗) = ∅ instead, then no experimentation history yielding
the standard of evidence can be ruled out. The probability that the agent experiments
until he has acquired a set of evidence that allows the statement n̂ = (0, n∗) is one in
both states and the decision maker’s posterior is equal to her prior. In particular, a
standard of evidence n∗ < (1−p)Uc cannot be persuasive.
It is in the agent’s interest to sometimes stop the search for arguments which renders
his arguments informative. Given that ex ante, the agent has an incentive to search for
n∗ arguments, the failure to provide them means that the probability that the state of
the world is in his favor is actually lower than the prior. Consequently, a successful col-
lection of the evidence n∗ boosts the posterior above the prior. Persuasive evidence has
the property that the agent stops experimenting often enough such that the successful
collection of the evidence indicates the favorable state with a probability that passes the
12
decision maker’s threshold of doubt, i.e.:
prob{s = 1|n̂ = (0, n∗)} =
∑
ht∈Hs(n∗)





Any n∗ which induces an experimentation plan such that Hs(n∗) ̸= ∅ and (2) holds
specifies an equilibrium. The next question to address is under which conditions there
is such an n∗.
If U/c < 2, Hs(n∗) = ∅ for any n∗ ≥ 1. Even if a single argument suffices to
persuade the decision maker, it is too expensive to acquire. For these parameters there
is no persuasion equilibrium (see Proposition 2 (i) below). A necessary condition for
the agent to be willing to engage in experimentation is U/c ≥ 2. A necessary condition
for the evidence to be persuasive is that the agent sometimes stops experimentation
unsuccessfully. Suppose that U/c ≥ 2 and one favorable argument suffices to persuade
the decision maker. If U/c < 1/2p(1 − p), the agent optimally experiments once and
stops after observing a failure. Ex ante, the probability to find a persuasive argument is
high enough to make the investment worthwhile. After an initial failure, the probability
that the next experiment yields a success is too low. Suppose the agent reveals a
favorable argument. The decision maker updates prob{s = 1|n̂ = (0, 1)} = p. If
the agent does not bring forward a favorable argument, the decision maker updates
prob{s = 1|n̂ = (0, 0)} = 1−p. If pd ≤ p, she chooses x = 1 if and only if the agent reveals
a favorable argument. An equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗ = 1 exists for such
a parameter constellation. (Only) in this persuasion equilibrium, the decision maker can
perfectly deduce the agent’s private information. Indeed, for any finite U/c ≥ 2, there
is a threshold for the signal’s precision such that the agent optimally stops searching if
the first experiment failed given that p exceeds the threshold, as it then becomes too
unlikely to obtain a favorable outcome. If in addition p ≥ pd, an equilibrium with a
standard of evidence n∗ = 1 exists (see Proposition 2 (ii) below).
If one argument suffices to persuade the decision maker and U/c ≥ 1/2p(1 − p),
it is optimal for the agent to continue experimentation after an initial failure. As a
consequence, the decision maker’s posterior is smaller than p when the agent reveals
a favorable argument. However, if U/c < 1/(1 − p), the agent has an incentive to
eventually stop experimenting as he becomes more and more convinced that s = 0
and further experimentation becomes too costly. Hence, the decision maker’s posterior
exceeds her prior when the agent presents a favorable argument. If pd is sufficiently close
to 1/2, an equilibrium in which the decision maker is persuaded by a single favorable
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argument exists as long as U/c < 1/(1 − p). The higher U/c, the stronger the agent’s
incentive for experimentation, and the (weakly) lower the decision maker’s posterior
upon the report of a successful experiment. Hence, the higher U or the lower c, the
(weakly) lower pd must be for an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗ = 1 to
exist. If U/c ≥ 1/(1 − p), Hf (1) = ∅, and an equilibrium with a standard of evidence
n∗ = 1 fails to exist.
We know from Lemma 1 (ii) that the decision maker can deter excessive experimen-
tation by requiring a larger number of arguments. If the agent has to acquire a larger
number of arguments in order to persuade the decision maker, this depresses his exper-
imentation incentives at all experimentation histories. Hence, a too high standard of
evidence may completely deter experimentation. From Lemma 1 (v) we can deduce that
if U/c ≥ n∗/2p(1− p), a standard of evidence n∗ induces experimentation on part of
the agent. As n∗/2p(1− p) < n∗/(1− p), we can always find U/c such that Hs(n∗) ̸= ∅
and Hf (n∗) ̸= ∅. If pd is sufficiently close to 1/2, the fact that Hf (n∗) ̸= ∅ suffices to
render the evidence n∗ persuasive. For such parameters an equilibrium with a standard
of evidence n∗ exists (see Proposition 2 (iii)).
On the other hand, as Proposition 2 (iv) shows, if U/c is too high to render n∗
persuasive, then an equilibrium with a higher standard of evidence exists if p is suffi-
ciently high. Increasing n∗ deters excessive private experimentation by rendering the
search more expensive after adverse histories. However, p needs to be sufficiently high
to eventually allow for separation, i.e., to deter experimentation at some, but not at
all experimentation histories. If p is close to 1/2, the ad interim success probability of
the next experiment is close to 1/2 at all experimentation histories. Hence, the agent’s
incentives to continue experimenting are almost exclusively driven by the number of
arguments (still) to be collected. For certain parameter constellations where p is too
low, any standard of evidence may only either trigger the agent’s unconditional experi-
mentation until the set of evidence is complete or induce no experimentation at all. For
such a parameter constellation, no persuasion equilibrium exists.13
A special case is c = 0. If experimentation is costless, the agent could identify the
state almost with certainty at zero costs. However, there is no equilibrium in which
the decision maker can be persuaded with hard evidence (Proposition 2 (v)). Suppose
in contrast that she could be persuaded with some set of evidence. The agent’s best
response is to search until he meets the standard of evidence, which happens almost with
13Remember that due to Proposition 1, non-existence of an equilibrium with a standard of evidence
n∗ implies that persuasion is impossible.
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certainty as p < 1. The decision maker in such a hypothetical equilibrium anticipates
that the standard of evidence is met regardless of the state. But then the evidence does
not have an informational value and should not be persuasive, leading to a contradiction.
Proposition 2 summarizes the results of the above discussion.
Proposition 2 (i) For U/c < 2, there is no equilibrium with some standard of evidence
n∗.
(ii) For 2 ≤ U/c < ∞, pd ≤ p and p ≥ p′, p′ < 1, an equilibrium with a standard of
evidence n∗ = 1 exists.
(iii) For each n∗, there are U and C, such that an equilibrium with a standard of evidence
n∗ exists if U ∈ U , c ∈ C, and pd is sufficiently close to 12 .
(iv) For 2 ≤ U/c < ∞ and pd sufficiently close to
1
2 , if there is no equilibrium with a
standard of evidence n∗ = 1, there is an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗ > 1
if p ≥ p′′, p′′ < 1.
(v) For c = 0, there is no persuasion equilibrium.
If there are multiple integers between (1−p)U/c and 2p(1−p)U/c and pd is sufficiently
close to 12 , multiple equilibria with different standards of evidence exist. A higher stan-
dard of evidence renders persuasion less likely, but is associated with a higher posterior
that s = 1 if the agent succeeds to persuade.
Proposition 3 The probability that s = 1 if x = 1 increases in the equilibrium standard
of evidence.
Consider a parameter constellation such that an equilibrium with some standard of
evidence n∗ exists and denote with n the lowest standard of evidence and with n the
highest standard of evidence attainable in equilibrium for this parameter constellation.
In an equilibrium with n, the decision maker’s posterior just passes her threshold of
doubt when the agent announces n̂ = (0, n). In an equilibrium with n the agent just
has an incentive to start experimentation.
Proposition 4 Any natural number between n and n is an equilibrium standard of
evidence.
The agent unambiguously prefers equilibria with lower standards of evidence, because
he persuades the decision maker with a higher probability at a lower expected cost. As
the agent fails to persuade the decision maker more often in an equilibrium with a higher
standard of evidence, one may conjecture that x = 0 is the wrong decision more often.
Example 1 below illustrates that this need not always be the case.
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7 ) and let pd < p.
(a) There is an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗ = 1.
Hf (1) = {(0)}, Hs(1) = {(1)}. prob{x = 1} = 1/2, prob{s = 1|x = 1} = p, prob{s =
1|x = 0} = 1− p.
(b) There is an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗ = 2.
Hf (2) = {(0), (1, 0, 0)}, Hs(2) = {(1, 1), (1, 0, 1)}. prob{x = 1} = 12 (1 − p(1 − p)),
prob{s = 1|x = 1} = p
2(2−p)
p2(2−p)+(1−p)2(1+p) , prob{s = 1|x = 0} = 1− p.
From an ex ante point of view, the agent’s experimentation induces a lottery over the
decision maker’s posteriors with one outcome above pd and one outcome below pd. As the
decision maker’s expected utility is weakly convex in her posterior (it is piecewise linear
with a kink at pd), she strictly prefers lotteries with more extreme outcomes. Hence,
she strictly prefers the equilibrium with a higher standard of evidence in Example 1.
In Example 2, a higher standard of evidence gives rise to a trade-off: Decreasing the
probability of wrongfully choosing x = 1 comes at the cost of increasing the probability
to wrongfully choose x = 0. As the decision maker is more averse to the first type of
error, she strictly prefers the higher standard of evidence in Example 2.




7 ) and let pd <
21
26 .
(a) There is an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗ = 1.
Hf (1) = {(0, 0)}, Hs(1) = {(1), (0, 1)}. prob{x = 1} = 1/2 + p(1 − p), prob{s = 1|x =
1} = p(2−p)1+2p(1−p) , prob{s = 1|x = 0} =
(1−p)2
(1−p)2+p2 .
(b) There is an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗ = 2.
Hf (2) = {(0), (1, 0, 0, 0)}, Hs(2) = {(1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 1)}. prob{x = 1} = 1/2(p2(1−
p(1 − p)) + (1 − p)2(1 + p)), prob{s = 1|x = 1} = p
2(2−p+(1−p)2)
p2(2−p+(1−p)2)+(1−p)2(1+p+p2) ,
prob{s = 1|x = 0} = 1−p+p(1−p)
3
1+p(1−p)3+p3(1−p) .
In both examples, the decision maker and the agent have diametrically opposed
preferences over the set of equilibria. In Example 1 (a) the agent’s information provision
is unbiased in the sense that from an ex ante viewpoint, the decision maker can be
persuaded to choose the agent’s preferred option with a probability equal to the ex ante
probability that this decision is best for her. In Examples 1 (b) and 2 (b), information
provision is biased against the agent, and it exhibits a bias in favor of the agent in
Example 2 (a). Note that for given parameters the higher n∗, the more often the agent
stops his evidence acquisition unsuccessfully. Hence, the higher n∗, the less often the
agent persuades the decision maker. If there is bias in favor of the agent for n∗ = n and a
bias against him for n∗ = n, then there is a threshold standard of evidence, below which
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optimal experimentation yields a bias in favor of the agent and above which information
provision is biased against him.
U/c can be viewed as an indicator for the size of an interested party. We now study
how the informational value of n̂ = (0, n∗) depends on U/c for a given n∗ ∈ [n, n]:
Proposition 5 If n∗ is an equilibrium standard of evidence for U/c = U ′′/c′′ and U/c =
U ′/c′, with U ′′/c′′ > U ′/c′, then prob{s = 1|n̂ = (0, n∗)} is weakly lower if U/c = U ′′/c′′
than if U/c = U ′/c′.
The higher the agent’s stakes U or the lower his cost of experimentation c are, the
stronger are his experimentation incentives. Hence, the maximum standard of evidence
that he is willing to provide (weakly) increases in U/c. At the same time, additional ex-
perimentation by the agent, in particular after having observed adverse experimentation
histories, reduces the informational value of n̂ = (0, n∗). Consequently, the minimum
standard of evidence that persuades the decision maker (weakly) increases in U/c. The
following proposition summarizes these findings.
Proposition 6 n and n are weakly increasing in U/c.
In the attempt to convince a decision maker of his position, an agent with a high
valuation for his preferred action typically has to provide more evidence in support for
his position than an agent with a low valuation. For instance, a small group of envi-
ronmentalists can be more persuasive with a given set of evidence than a big firm with
the same set of evidence. Our analysis offers an explanation for this phenomenon. The
value of the evidence that an interested party provides depends on the experimentation
incentives. An interested party with a high valuation for the preferred decision has
stronger incentives to acquire favorable arguments even if it already encountered a lot
of counterarguments during the search. As we have seen above, this dilutes the value
of the arguments that are finally presented to the decision maker. Consequently, the
value of the same hard evidence may be different, depending on the type of interested
party presenting it. If the valuations of interested parties differ sufficiently, then the
corresponding intervals [n, n] do not overlap and an interested party with a high val-
uation has to provide strictly more evidence for persuasion in order to deter excessive
experimentation. An analogous argument holds with respect to experimentation costs.
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5 Extensions
In this section, we study two extensions of our model in the context of a particular appli-
cation. We consider a researcher who tries to persuade the editor of a scientific journal
to publish his work in her journal. We assume that the researcher faces high-powered
publication-based incentives such that he always prefers his work to be published (x = 1).
The editor, on the other hand, needs to be sufficiently convinced that the researcher’s
hypothesis is true in order to be willing to publish his work.
In the context of this application, we can distinguish “symmetric” problems from
“asymmetric” ones. An example for an asymmetric problem is the question whether
a certain surprising, unanticipated effect exists. Rejecting existence typically does not
merit publication in a top journal. Such asymmetries are widespread. An asymmetric
problem gives rise to the persuasion game that we already studied. We can directly apply
the results of our analysis above. If the researcher cares sufficiently about institutional
incentives (i.e., if U is high), then due to the opportunity of private experimentation
and selective revelation of experimental outcomes, the arguments brought forward can-
not be taken at face value. Our comparative statics results suggest that ceteris paribus
more arguments have to be provided for successful persuasion if the researcher’s stakes
are higher and/or the experimentation costs are lower. Technical innovations like the
internet, faster computers and better mathematics programs have decreased experimen-
tation costs. As a consequence, more arguments (e.g., robustness checks, or various
specifications of a regression analysis) may have to be provided to persuasively support
a hypothesis.14
In a symmetric problem, the acceptance and the rejection of the hypothesis under
consideration are equally interesting, and both findings may be considered for publica-
tion in a top journal. In our first extension, we study the game under the alternative
specification of the decision maker’s preferences.
Applying our model to the publication of research articles, it is plausible to assume
an upper bound on the number of arguments that the agent can bring forward in favor
of his findings. For instance, there may be a limit to the number of pages of a research
article, or the editor may not be willing to handle an unlimited number of arguments.
In our second extension, we impose an upper bound on the number of arguments that
can be transmitted.
14The appendix of a paper published in Econometrica in 1985 constitutes on average roughly 6% of
the paper. In 2009, it is roughly 21%. The average length of an article in Econometrica in 1985 is
roughly 19 pages and in 2009, it is roughly 37.
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5.1 Symmetric problems
We adjust the model as follows. After the experimentation phase, the agent writes a
paper in which he either claims that s = 1 or he claims that s = 0. If the agent claims
that s = 1, the decision maker’s utility when choosing x in state s is:
u1(x, s) s = 1 s = 0
x = 1 0 −pd
x = 0 −(1− pd) 0
If the agent claims that s = 0, the decision maker’s utility when choosing x in state
s is:
u0(x, s) s = 1 s = 0
x = 1 −pd 0
x = 0 0 −(1− pd)
It is optimal for the decision maker to choose x = 1 if her assessment of the probabil-
ity that s = 1 exceeds pd and the agent argues in favor of s = 1, or if her assessment of
the probability that s = 0 exceeds pd and the agent argues in favor of s = 0. Otherwise,
it is optimal for her to choose x = 0. The agent, as before, is only interested in x. If
the decision rule is symmetric, the agent chooses to argue for the state that he considers
more likely. We focus on equilibria in which counterarguments are not required in or-
der to persuade the decision maker and in which she treats evidence in both directions





1, if n̂0 = 0, n̂1 ≥ n∗ or n̂0 ≥ n∗, n̂1 = 0
0, else.
Consider a given n∗ and suppose that it is optimal for the agent to engage in experi-
mentation. Then, he will stop experimentation if and only if max{n0, n1} = n∗. For any
experimentation history, the chances to meet the standard of evidence are better than
ex ante as the stock of arguments that will be used for persuasion is higher. Hence, the
number of arguments to be acquired is lower, and the probability to acquire a favorable
outcome with the next trial is (weakly) higher as well. Thus, the optimal experimen-
tation plan is to either keep on experimenting until the standard of evidence is met or
not to start experimenting at all. The expected cost of the former experimentation plan
is increasing in n∗. There exists a c′(n∗), decreasing in n∗, such that it is optimal to
engage in experimentation if and only if c < c′(n∗).
The agent stops if and only if he has successfully acquired n∗ arguments (pro or
contra). Unlike in the asymmetric case, n∗ does not obtain its informational value from
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the agent’s stopping behavior, i.e., by ruling out experimentation histories which do not
occur under optimal experimentation. Instead, n∗ has an informational value because
the agent chooses to argue for the position for which he has acquired more arguments.
The agent’s posterior that he is arguing for the truth is strictly increasing in the “net”
evidence |n1 − n0| he is endowed with. The probability that the decision maker assigns
to the agent arguing for the truth is equal to the ex ante expected value of all the agent’s
possible posteriors. The higher n∗, the more probability mass is on large realizations of
|n1 − n0|, i.e., the higher is the informational value of the agent’s announcement. If the
informational value of an announcement n∗ exceeds pd and c < c′(n∗), an equilibrium
with a standard of evidence n∗ exists. In particular, if pd < p and c ≤ U , there is
an equilibrium in which the agent conducts a single experiment and reports the result
to the decision maker, who is persuaded by the evidence. The decision maker strictly
prefers equilibria with higher standards of evidence, whereas the agent strictly prefers
lower standards.
In the symmetric case, a higher experimentation cost c deters experimentation if the
number of arguments needed to persuade is too high. However, the experimentation
cost has no effect on the informational value of an announcement n∗. Our conclusion is
that for symmetric problems, low experimentation costs are desirable in order to make
engagement in research attractive.
5.2 A bound on n
In this subsection, we introduce an exogenous maximum amount of evidence N that the
agent can transmit to the decision maker. In the context of the asymmetric problem,
we have pointed out that excessive experimentation can be counteracted by demanding
more evidence. However, if the amount of evidence that can be brought forward is
limited, demanding more evidence becomes infeasible at that point.
If c ≤ U(1−p)N , no persuasion equilibrium exists. Suppose that there is a n
′ ≤ N
such that the decision maker chooses x = 1 if the agent announces n̂ = (0, n′). If
c < U(1−p)n′ , the agent has an incentive to experiment until he has acquired n
′ favorable
arguments even if he is sure that the state of the world is 0. Thus, a necessary condition
for n′ to have an informational value is that c > U(1−p)
n′
. If c ≤ U(1−p)
N
, this condition
cannot be satisfied. Hence, the announcement n′ is equally likely in both states such
that prob{s = 1| n̂ = (0, n′)} = 1/2 and the decision maker is better off choosing x = 0.
If the amount of evidence that is necessary to be persuasive exceeds the limit due to
low c or high U , then no persuasion equilibrium exists. Excessive private experimenta-
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tion can be deterred by making the acquisition of arguments sufficiently expensive. In
the context of our application, the scientific community can increase the costs, e.g., by
imposing restrictions on arguments that are admissible. It tends to be harder to find
arguments given such restrictions. This reduces private experimentation and increases
the value of evidence such that the limit is not binding.
Our analysis offers an explanation for the observation that the use of new methods
tends not to be well received by the scientific community.15 If a researcher deviates from
standard methods, then the additional degree of freedom offers more scope for excessive
private experimentation. Even if new methods have a higher explanatory power at face
value, the lower costs of finding arguments can decrease their overall value due to the
incentive to experiment excessively.16
In his influential book, Kuhn (1970) states that in “normal times” researchers solve
puzzles with the methods inherent in the current paradigm. When addressing a research
question, researchers expect certain solutions which match with the paradigm. In the
context of our model, we may want to view normal times as times in which researchers
predominantly work on “asymmetric problems”. In normal times, new methods are not
welcome. Kuhn further says that as over time more and more anomalies appear, doubt
is cast on the current paradigm and eventually a scientific revolution is triggered. New
schools emerge and battle each other until a new paradigm evolves. The appearance of
too many anomalies makes the scientific community reflect more on the methods that
are used. At this stage the “threshold of doubt” may be lowered and/or problems may
be viewed as more symmetric. Both would encourage the use of new methods.
6 Conclusion
When trying to find arguments for the preferred course of action, private experimen-
tation and a selective revelation of the results are common practice. The process of
thinking about arguments typically occurs in private. Due to an incentive to hide coun-
terarguments, arguments cannot always be taken at face value.
Excessive private experimentation can be deterred by requiring a sufficiently large
number of arguments. With each counterargument that an interested agent encounters,
he becomes more and more pessimistic that he can acquire a set of persuasive arguments
within the next few trials. As each trial is costly, the agent stops experimentation if the
15Kuhn (1970) documents ample evidence that new methods are not welcome in what he calls “normal
times”.
16A formal argument supporting this claim can be found in the appendix.
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number of arguments that he still needs to acquire in order to persuade is too large and at
the same time the probability to encounter a favorable argument is too small. The fewer
experiments are conducted in private, the more valuable are the agent’s arguments for
the decision maker. The informational value of a certain number of favorable arguments
is the higher, the higher the experimentation costs and the lower the agent’s stakes.
Our theory contributes to explaining why the interpretation of hard evidence may
depend on whether it is presented by an agent with high stakes or by an agent with low
stakes. If the former gives up experimentation unsuccessfully less often, the value of the
(identical) hard evidence provided is lower.
In applications, in which time or capacity constraints impose an upper bound on the
number of arguments that can be submitted to the decision maker, excessive private
experimentation can depress the informational value of any feasible number of argu-
ments so much that persuasion is impossible. Our paper offers an explanation why
restrictive standards on arguments can have a value in the presence of such capacity
constraints. Restrictions tend to increase experimentation costs and thereby reduce pri-
vate experimentation. This can increase the arguments’ informational value such that
they eventually become persuasive.
In this paper, we model arguments as imperfect evidence for a certain state of the
world that are acquired privately and sequentially. In future work it would be interesting
to further explore the key properties of arguments and their implications in settings of
strategic information transmission. In particular, it could be fruitful to take account of
the possibility to support one’s position with logical arguments in a mechanism design
framework.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i) follows from Lemmata A1–A3 below. Part (ii): In
an equilibrium in which the decision maker always chooses x = 0 the agent’s expected
payoff is zero. In an equilibrium with a standard of evidence n∗, zero payoff is attainable
by not experimenting and announcing nothing. As the agent does not choose this action,
he must be weakly better off. The agent’s possible announcements induce a (possibly
degenerate) lottery over the decision maker’s posteriors. Her expected utility is piecewise
linear and weakly convex in the posterior, and exhibits a kink at pd. She is indifferent
between all equilibria in which only posteriors smaller than (or equal to) pd realize with
a positive probability, and she strictly prefers an equilibrium in which a posterior greater
than pd realizes with a positive probability. Q.E.D.
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Lemma A 1 Suppose there exists a persuasion equilibrium in which x∗ = 1 if n̂0 =
a, n̂1 = b, with a > 0. Then there exists a persuasion equilibrium in which x∗ = 1 if
n̂0 = 0, n̂1 = b. The latter is either payoff-equivalent or Pareto-dominant.
Proof. Whenever the agent’s information endowment allows him to make the
announcement (a, b), he can also make the announcement (0, b). If his information
endowment allows him to make the announcement (0, b), but not (a, b), then it is more
likely that the state is 1 than if the latter announcement is available. Thus, if the decision
maker is persuaded if the agent announces (a, b), it should also be possible to persuade
her with the announcement (0, b). If the decision maker is persuaded by (0, b) in the
supposed equilibrium, then the implication in the lemma as well as payoff-equivalence
immediately follows. Suppose that she is not persuaded upon the announcement (0, b).
Then the announcement (0, b) must be an out-of-equilibrium-event attached with adverse
beliefs. Then, there exists another equilibrium in which the decision maker chooses
x = 1 for all the announcements for which she does so in the original equilibrium, and,
in addition, for the announcement (0, b). In the latter equilibrium, the agent makes
persuasive announcements more often, and the probability that s = 1 conditional on the
agent making a persuasive statement is also higher. Hence, the decision maker obtains a
higher expected payoff. The agent is better off because he persuades the decision maker
more often to choose his preferred alternative and incurs a lower experimentation cost.
Q.E.D.
Lemma A1 allows us to focus on equilibria in which counterarguments are not needed
in order to convince the decision maker. The next lemma further reduces the set of
equilibria under consideration to those where the announcement of counterarguments
would be harmful.
Lemma A 2 Suppose there exists a persuasion equilibrium in which x∗ = 1 iff n̂0 ∈
N0, n̂1 ≥ b, where N0 is a set of natural numbers including 0. Then there exists a
payoff-equivalent persuasion equilibrium in which x∗ = 1 iff n̂0 = 0, n̂1 ≥ b.
Proof. The agent does not experiment more than necessary to persuade the
decision maker. He stops (latest) if he has found b arguments in his favor. Hence,
regarding experimentation, he best-responds in the same way to both decision rules. If
he finds arguments against him during that search, he does not prefer any (feasible)
announcement to n̂0 = 0. Hence, his best responses to both decision rules yield the
same utility. As the agent’s search behavior is identical and his announcement behavior
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equivalent, the decision maker makes the same inferences (now attaching adverse beliefs
to out-of-equilibrium-announcements n̂0 > 0). Hence, if the first decision rule is a best
response, then the second one is a best response as well. The decision maker attains the
same payoff in both cases. Q.E.D.
The last step is to identify a persuasion equilibrium with the minimum number of
arguments needed to convince the decision maker.
Lemma A 3 Suppose there exists a persuasion equilibrium in which x∗ = 1 iff n̂0 =
0, n̂1 ∈ N1, where N1 is a set of natural numbers and n∗ is the smallest of them. Then
there exists a payoff-equivalent persuasion equilibrium in which x∗ = 1 iff n̂0 = 0, n̂1 ≥
n∗.
Proof. Given that n∗ arguments are enough to persuade the decision maker,
the agent never collects more than n∗ arguments in equilibrium. The decision rule for
announcements n̂1 > n∗ is not relevant neither for the agent’s experimentation and
announcement strategy nor for the players’ payoffs. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) The number of arguments still to be acquired is the same,
the agent’s assessment of the probability distribution of experimental outcomes is the
same. Hence, the continuation utility is the same.
(ii) Suppose n∗ arguments suffice to persuade the decision maker. Suppose the agent
executes the experimentation plan that is optimal for acquiring n∗ + 1 arguments at
histories ht : n1 < n∗, and stops at histories ht : n1 = n∗. This (possibly suboptimal)
experimentation plan yields a higher expected utility for the agent than that associated
with optimal experimentation if he needs n∗ + 1 arguments to persuade the decision
maker as he persuades her with a (weakly) higher probability and faces strictly lower
expected costs of experimentation.
(iii) With a larger stock of favorable arguments, there are less arguments still to be
acquired. Moreover, ceteris paribus, favorable experimental outcomes are more likely.
(iv) The probability that an experiment yields a favorable outcome is ceteris paribus
lower if the number of unfavorable arguments is higher. Hence, expected experimenta-
tion costs are higher and/or the probability to persuade is lower.
(v) The number of experiments to be conducted to meet the standard of evidence
follows a negative binomial distribution with success probability p in state s = 1 and
success probability 1 − p in state s = 0. With success probability π, the expected




















Figure 1: Steps of the algorithm in case n∗ = 4
Ad interim, the probability that the success probability is p is γ(n0, n1) at history
(n0, n1). With probability 1 − γ(n0, n1), the success probability is 1 − p. Hence, the
interim expected number of experiments to be conducted until the standard of evidence
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Algorithm for the identification of the equilibrium experimentation plan and
the associated sets of successful and unsucessful histories
We illustrate the algorithm with the help of Figure 1, which depicts the steps of
the algorithm for n∗ = 4. Each “node” Kn0;n1 in Figure 1 corresponds to a stock of
failed and successful experiments (n0, n1). Note that multiple experimentation histories
can lead to a particular node. The posterior and the number of favorable outcomes still
needed to persuade the decision maker at a particular Kn0;n1 is the same for all histories
leading to this Kn0;n1 . Therefore, the continuation value at a particular Kn0;n1 is the
same for all histories leading to this Kn0;n1 .
Figure 1 depicts all the histories in Hs(n∗ = 4) and Hf (n∗ = 4) associated with the
agent’s optimal experimentation plan. The agent starts experimenting with a stock of
arguments (0, 0), i.e., at node K0;0. The line down from K0;0 indicates that the first
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experiment fails. The line up (of the same length) indicates that the first experiment is
successful. According to the experimentation plan depicted in Figure 1, the agent stops
unsuccessfully in case the first experiment fails, i.e., at K1;0. He continues searching
if the first experiment is successful, i.e., at K0;1. The following lines are interpreted
analogously. As n∗ = 4 in Figure 1, the agent stops searching successfully if he has
acquired four favorable pieces of evidence. (These are the histories ending at upward-
pointing lines.)
The first step is to identify the critical stock of failed experiments n0n∗−1, with the
property that it is optimal for the agent to continue searching only once more for the
last piece of favorable evidence, i.e., to continue searching at Kn0
n∗−1
;n∗−1 and to stop
searching unsuccessfully at Kn0
n∗−1
+1;n∗−1.
17 In order to enable us to determine optimal
stopping for all n1 < n∗ − 1, we next calculate the continuation values at all Kn0;n∗−1,
with n0 < n0n∗−1. This corresponds to step 2. We then need to identify the number
of failed experiments n0n∗−2, where it is optimal for the agent to continue searching
at Kn0
n∗−2
;n∗−2, and to stop searching if Kn0
n∗−2
+1;n∗−2. This corresponds to step 3.
In order to determine optimal stopping for all n1 < n∗ − 2, we need to calculate the
continuation values at all Kn0;n∗−2, with n0 < n0n∗−2. This corresponds to step 4. The
procedure is then continued analogously for all n1 < n∗ − 2.
Step 1: Calculate n0n∗−1, the largest n
0, such that the agent is just willing to continue
searching once more if he lacks one last favorable piece of evidence for persuasion,18 i.e.,
the largest n0 for which the following inequality holds.
β(n0, n∗ − 1)U + (1− β(n0, n∗ − 1))0− c ≥ 0,
where β(n0, n∗ − 1) = γ(n0, n∗ − 1)p + (1 − γ(n0, n∗ − 1))(1 − p) with γ(n0, n∗ − 1) =
prob{s = 1|(n0, n∗ − 1)} = 1
1+( 1−pp )
n∗−1−n0
and n0 is the only unknown. The solution
is n0n∗−1. The continuation value at Kn0
n∗−1
;n∗−1 is equal to vcn∗(n
0
n∗−1, n
∗ − 1) =
17For expositional convenience, we use the notation n0
n1
in this algorithm as the maximum number
of failed experiments for which the agent is willing to conduct a further experiment given his stock
of successful experiments n1. Note that if !n(n1) is finite, then n0
n1
= !n(n1) − 1. If there is no finite
number n0n∗−1, start with the largest stock of favorable outcomes ň
1 < n∗ − 1 for which the agent
sometimes optimally stops the search unsuccessfully.
18Suppose that U , c and p are such that the agent wants to stop searching for the last remaning
favorable outcome if the posterior is too low. Otherwise, the algorithm starts by identifying ň1, the
highest stock of favorable outcomes such that the agent stops searching unsuccessfully for some finite
stock of unfavorable outcomes ň0+1 (see the previous footnote). With a stock of ň1 favorable outcomes
and ň0 unfavorable ones, the continuation value if the next experiment is successful is then not U but
equal to U − (1−2p)γ(ň
0 ,ň1+1)+p
p(1−p) (n
∗ − ň1 − 1)c. The remaining part of the algorithm is analogous.
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β(n0n∗−1, n
∗ − 1)U − c.
Step 2: Start with calculating the continuation value at Kn0
n∗−1
−1;n∗−1. The con-
tinuation value after a successful experiment is U and it is obtained with probability
β(n0n∗−1 − 1, n




∗ − 1), i.e., the continuation value derived in step 1. This value is reached
with probability (1− β(n0n∗−1 − 1, n












1) − c. The continuation values for all Kn0;n∗−1 with n0 < n0n∗−1 − 1 are successively
determined analogously.
Step 3: Note that it cannot be optimal to continue searching at some Kn0;n∗−2 with
n0 > n0n∗−1, as the agent has to find more evidence in his favor than above and the
posterior that s = 1 is lower than at Kn0
n∗−1
;n∗−1. Start with the hypothesis that the
agent is willing to continue searching at Kn0
n∗−1
;n∗−2. This holds true if
β(n0n∗−1, n
∗ − 2) · vcn∗(n
0
n∗−1, n
∗ − 1) + (1− β(n0n∗−1, n




∗ − 1) was calculated in step 2. Otherwise, successively move to
smaller n0 for given n1 = n∗ − 2, until the continuation value gets positive, using the
continuation values vcn∗(n
0, n∗ − 1) determined in step 2.
Step 4: Continue analogously to step 2 for n1 = n∗ − 2 and n0 smaller than the
critical level derived in step 3. Continue analogously for n1 < n∗ − 2.
The sets of histories Hs(n∗) and Hf (n∗) directly follow from the above procedure:
All histories that end with a successful experiment are elements of Hs(n∗). All histories
that end with an unsuccessful experiment are elements of Hf (n∗).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) The incentive to experiment is strongest if a single
argument suffices to persuade the decision maker. The incentive is strongest at the
first attempt, where the probability to succeed is 1/2. In subsequent trials, the success
probability is lower than 1/2. For U/c < 2, the first attempt to acquire a favorable
argument yields negative expected utility.
(ii) As U/c > 2, it pays to conduct an experiment which succeeds with probability
1/2. Suppose the experiment fails. The probability that the next trial yields a success
is 2p(1− p). The agent has no incentive for further experimentation if 2p(1− p)U < c,






′. Note that p′ < 1 for finite U/c. If p > p′, prob{s = 1|n̂ =
(0, 1)} = p ≥ pd, such that the decision maker can be persuaded with one argument.
(iii) A sufficient condition for engaging in experimentation is U/c ≥ n
∗
2p(1−p) . A






(1−p) ensures that some
27
U/c satisfies both conditions. Hf (n∗) ̸= ∅ implies that prob{s = 1|n̂ = (0, n∗)} > 12
such that the decision maker is optimally persuaded by n∗ if pd is sufficiently close to 12 .
(iv) Consider first a standard of evidence n′ > 1 and suppose that Hf (n′) = ∅. We
show that there is n′′ > n′ such that the agent stops experimenting for some history.
We need to make sure that Hs(n′′) ̸= ∅. If the standard of evidence is increased by one,
n∗ = n′+1, the agent still has an incentive to engage in experimentation if U/c ≥ n
′+1
2p(1−p) .
As Hf (n′) = ∅, we know that U/c ≥ n
′
(1−p) . The latter inequality implies the former if
p ≥ n
′+1
2n′ . For n
′ = 2, the agent’s incentive for excessive experimentation when he has
to acquire two arguments implies that he is willing to engage in the search for three
arguments if p ≥ 34 . The higher n
′, the lower the threshold above which p must lie to
apply the argument. If Hf (n′ + 1) = ∅, we can successively increase the standard of
evidence without deterring experimentation completely until the agent sometimes stops
experimentation unsuccessfully and the evidence becomes persuasive. Now, consider
n′ = 1 and suppose Hf (1) = ∅. Consider n∗ = 2, and consider the agent’s expected
utility when he engages in experimentation, and (sub-optimally) stops as soon as he
observes a negative outcome or he meets the standard of evidence n∗ = 2. Then, the
probability to persuade the decision maker is 12 (1 − 2p(1 − p)) and the expected cost
of experimenting is 12 (c + 2c). This experimentation plan is better than not engaging










(v) If experimentation is costless, Hf (n∗) = ∅ for all n∗. prob{s = 1| n̂ = (0, n∗)} = 12
such that the decision maker cannot be persuaded. Q.E.D.
Preliminaries for the proof of Proposition 3. For the proof of Proposition
3 we need to define the probability that s = 1 given that the decision maker observes
persuasive evidence and where she knows that the agent at some point had a stock
of evidence (n0, n1), i.e., that the history leading to the persuasive evidence passed
through node Kn0;n1 .19 Denote this probability by prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)}, where
Hs(Kn0;n1) contains all the histories of Hs(n∗) that pass through node Kn0;n1 . ñ(n1)
is the cutoff number of failed experiments such that the agent continues the search at
node Kn0;n1 if and only if n0 < ñ(n1).
For the proof we need the following Lemma, which provides an order of prob{s =
1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} for subsequent nodes.
19The notation Kn0;n1 was introduced in the algorithm for the identification of the equilibrium
experimentation plan.
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Lemma A 4 Consider the nodes Kn0;n1 that are reached with a positive probability
according to a given plan. We have
(i) prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} is strictly decreasing in n
0.
(ii) If ñ(n1−1) is finite and n0 = ñ(n1−1)−1, then prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1−1)} =
prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)}.
(iii) If ñ(n1−1) is finite and n0 < ñ(n1−1)−1, then prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1−1)} <
prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)}.
(iv) If ñ(n1 − 1) is infinite, then prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1−1)} < prob{s = 1|ht ∈
Hs(Kn0;n1)}.
Proof of Lemma A 4. (i) It is convenient to determine the relation between the
conditional probabilities backwards in the experimentation plan as follows.
(1) Start with the nodes at which the agent has collected all the evidence n1 = n∗













) is strictly decreasing in n0. This proves the statement for n∗ = 1.
(2) For n∗ > 1, consider next all nodes Kn0;n∗−1. If the agent is at a node Kn0;n∗−1,
then two things may happen with a strictly positive probability. Either the next ex-
periment is successful, in which case the conditional probability is prob{s = 1|ht ∈
Hs(Kn0;n∗)}. Or the next experiment is a failure, in which case the conditional proba-
bility is prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0+1;n∗−1)}, which is weakly lower than prob{s = 1|ht ∈
Hs(Kn0+1;n∗)}. As prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n∗)} > prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0+1;n∗)}
according to Step (1), we have prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n∗−1)} > prob{s = 1|ht ∈
Hs(Kn0+1;n∗−1)}.
(3) Analogously, for n∗ > 2, we can derive the order of prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)}
at subsequent nodes for all other nodes working backwards through the experimentation
plan.
(ii) If ñ(n1−1) is finite and n0 = ñ(n1−1)−1 we have prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1−1)} =
prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} as all the histories through node Kn0;n1−1 potentially lead-
ing to successful persuasion must pass through Kn0;n1 .20
(iii) Let n0 < ñ(n1 − 1)− 1. At such a node Kn0;n1−1 two things may happen with a
strictly positive probability. Either the next experiment is successful, in which case the
conditional probability is prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} or the next experiment is not
successful, in which case the conditional probability is lower than at Kn0;n1 according
to (i). Hence, prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} > prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1−1)}.

























Figure 2: Relations between the nodes in experimentation plan P
(iv) Analogous to (iii). Q.E.D.
Figure 2 illustrates the relative size of prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} at subsequent
nodes in an example experimentation plan, where a “>” between two nodes Kn0;n1 and
Kn0′;n1′ indicates that prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} > prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0′;n1′)}.
A “=” is interpreted analogously.
Proof of Proposition 3. Denote the optimal experimentation plan for a given
standard of evidence n∗ by P (n∗). We construct a plan P ′(n∗ + 1) that is identical
to P (n∗) up to the collection of n∗ favorable outcomes, but then the agent searches
for the (n∗ + 1)th favorable outcome until he finds it. It follows that prob{s = 1|ht ∈
Hs(P (n∗))} = prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(P ′(n∗ + 1))}.21 Note that for each node where the
agent optimally continues experimenting in P (n∗+1), the agent continues experimenting
in P ′(n∗ + 1).22 The reverse however is not true. Indeed, there must be some histories
for which P ′(n∗ + 1) prescribes to continue, but it is optimal for the agent to stop
experimenting according to P (n∗ +1). We can approximate P ′(n∗ +1) with a sequence
of modified experimentation plans based on P (n∗ + 1) and show that prob{s = 1|ht ∈
Hs(.)} decreases with each modification. Set P 0 = P (n∗ + 1). Each element P τ of
21Hs(P (.)) is the set of histories containing persuasive evidence if the agent searches according to
experimentation plan P (.).
22See Lemma 1 (ii).
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the sequence differs from its follower P τ+1 only at some node Kn0;n1 up to which the
agent continues experimenting for both plans. At Kn0;n1 , he stops searching according
to P τ but continues searching according to P ′(n∗ + 1). P τ+1 is such that the agent
now continues searching at Kn0;n1 as follows: (i) If the next experiment is a failure,
then he stops searching. (ii) If the next experiment is successful, then he continues
searching according to P τ . Hence, all new histories leading to persuasive evidence must
pass through node Kn0;n1+1 of P τ and, from Kn0;n1+1 onwards, the agent’s continuation
decisions are as in P τ .23
Note that prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Ki;j)} and, hence, the relations between the condi-
tional probabilities depend on the experimentation plan under consideration.24 As we
aim to compare P τ with the modified plan P τ+1, we need to make sure that we do not
confuse prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Ki;j)} (and hence the relations between them) from differ-
ent plans. It is therefore important to note that the part of the experimentation plan
P τ+1 that follows node Kn0;n1+1 equals the part of the experimentation plan P τ that
follows node Kn0;n1+1. As all the histories through Kn0;n1 that yield persuasive evidence
according to P τ+1 must pass through Kn0;n1+1 we have prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} =
prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1+1)} where, importantly, the right hand side of the equality
refers to plan P τ .
We need to show that prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(P τ+1)} < prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(P τ )},
where prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(P τ )} = prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(K0;0)}. As the set of successful
histories of plan P τ+1 consist of the “old” successful histories originating from node
K0;0 of plan P τ and the “new” (additional) successful histories through Kn0;n1 , which
pass through Kn0;n1+1 of plan P τ , it is straightforward that the inequality holds if the
posterior based on persuasive evidence of the “new” successful histories is lower than
the posterior based on persuasive evidence of the “old” successful histories. I.e., the
inequality holds if prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(K0;0)} > prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1+1)}, where
both conditional probabilities in the latter inequality refer to plan P τ .25 By exploiting
the relative size of the conditional probabilities according to Lemma A 4 (see also Figure
2) we indeed have prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(K0;0)} > prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1+1)}.
In order to ensure that the cutoff number of failed experiments at which the agent
23Note that, as P ′(n∗+1) prescribes to continue searching for the final favorable outcome ad infinitum,
we may need an infinite sequence of such modifications to construct P ′(n∗ + 1).
24For example, at node K0;0, i.e., where experimentation starts, prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(K0;0)} differs
for P (n∗) and P (n∗ + 1).
25By construction prob{s = 1|ht ∈ Hs(Kn0;n1)} of plan P
τ+1 is equal to prob{s = 1|ht ∈
Hs(Kn0;n1+1)} of plan P
τ .
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stops experimenting unsuccessfully is monotonic in his stock of successful experiments,
the sequence of modified plans is constructed as follows: We subsequently increase ñ(n1)
by one at nodes where P (n∗+1) and P ′(n∗+1) differ, starting at the node with a stock
of evidence (ñ(n∗), n∗) (assuming that ñ(n∗) is higher under P ′(n∗+1)), then ñ(n∗− 1)
is increased by one (again assuming that the cutoff is higher under P ′(n∗ + 1)) and so
on. Once ñ(0) is reached, the second round is started by increasing ñ(n∗) by one more
unit, working backwards through the experimenation tree again and so on. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in three steps. In part (i) it is shown
that prob{s = 1|n̂ = (0, n∗)} ≥ pd in each hypothetical equilibrium with n∗ > n. In
part (ii) we argue that the failure to provide the equilibrium standard of evidence n∗,
n∗ > n yields a decision against the agent. In part (iii) we show that the agent has an
incentive to start searching in each hypothetical equilibrium with n∗ < n. These three
parts directly imply the statement.
(i) As n by definition constitutes an equilibrium standard of evidence, the provision
of this evidence passes the decision maker’s threshold of doubt in an equilibrium with
n∗ = n. According to Proposition 3 the probability that s = 1 if x = 1 increases in the
equilibrium standard of evidence.
(ii) In an equilibrium with n∗ > n, the failure to meet the standard of evidence implies
that the agent stopped searching unsuccessfully, which only happens if his posterior belief
suggests that state s = 1 is less likely than ex ante. The decision maker can thus deduce
that s = 0 is more likely and it is optimal to decide against the agent.
(iii) Consider two equilibria with standards of evidence n∗ = n′ and n∗ = n′′ with
n′ < n′′. In an equilibrium with n′ the agent has the option to (sub-optimally) follow
the same experimentation plan as in an equilibrium with n′′. Given this (suboptimal)
plan he can make the announcement n̂ = (0, n′), if he has found n′ favorable arguments.
The optimal experimentation must yield a weakly higher ex ante payoff. Therefore, the
incentive to start experimenting decreases in n∗. Q.E.D.
Verification of equilibria presented in Examples 1 and 2. (1) To verify that
(a) and (b) describe equilibrium behavior, we check the agent’s incentives to stop ex-
perimenting for each history in Hf (n∗) and his incentive to continue experimenting for
each sub-history up to the last experiment in Hs(n∗) (note that this set of histories
contains the set of sub-histories in Hf (n∗)). For the histories for which the agent stops
unsuccessfully, we have γ = 1− p. As U/c ≤ 12p(1−p) =
32
7 , it does not pay for the agent
to try to find neither two nor one remaining piece of evidence. For the histories for
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which he continues experimenting, γ is at least 1/2. Hence, his incentives to continue
experimenting stay intact for these histories given that he started. The incentive to
start experimenting is weaker in (b) than in (a). It pays to execute the experimentation
plan in (b) if U/c ≥ 3+2p(1−p)1−p(1−p) =
206
57 . Note that prob{s = 1|n̂ = (0, n
∗)} ≥ p in (a) for
n∗ = 1 and (b) for n∗ = 2. It follows from pd < p that the decision rule is optimal for
the decision maker.
(2) Consider first (a). It is optimal for the agent to stop experimenting when the
first two experiments fail if β(2, 0)U − c < 0, i.e., if U/c < 1−2p(1−p)
p(1−p) =
50
7 . It is





7 . Given that it is optimal to continue after one failure, it is
optimal to start ex ante. Hence, the experimentation plan is optimal for the parameter











26 > pd. Hence, it is a best response for the
decision maker to choose in favor of the agent if he provides a single favorable outcome.
Consider next (b). It pays to execute the suggested experimentation plan if 12 (p
2 +
(1− p)2)(U − 2c) + 12 (p
2(1− p) + (1− p)2p)(U − 3c) + 122p
2(1− p)2(U − 4c) + 12 (−c) +
1
2 (p(1 − p)
3 + (1 − p)p3)(−4c) ≥ 0, i.e., if U/c ≥ 3(1+p(1−p))1−p(1−p)(1−2p(1−p)) =
6816
1873 , which
is satisfied for the given parameters. After an initial success, the agent’s incentive to
experiment stays intact. Note that after an initial success followed by a failure, the agent
is in the same strategic situation as in Example 2(a). Hence, it is optimal for him to
continue experimenting at history (1, 0, 0) and to stop at history (1, 0, 0, 0). It remains
to verify that stopping is optimal after an initial failure. The agent anticipates that he
optimally stops after history (0, 0) (this is implied by the fact that it is optimal to stop
the search for only one argument, as shown above), and that he optimally continues after
history (0, 1), subsequently following the plan as described in Example 2(a). Hence, his
continuation utility after an initial failure is (1−p)[p2(U −2c)+p2(1−p)(U −3c)− (1−
p)c−p(1−p)23c]+p[(1−p)2(U−2c)+p(1−p)2(U−3c)−pc−p2(1−p)3c], which is negative
if U/c < 1+3p(1−p)
p(1−p)(1+2p(1−p)) =
2720
273 . This is satisfied for the given parameters. Hence, it is
optimal to stop experimenting after an initial failure. Given this experimentation plan,





which is greater than pd. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. The larger the agent’s utility and/or the lower the costs,
the stronger is his incentive to engage (further) in experimentation at any history ht. If
U/c = U ′′/c′′, he may continue experimentation at a history ht with n0 > n1 for which
33
he stops experimentation if U/c = U ′/c′. Thus, an analogous reasoning as in the proof
of Proposition 3, i.e., to construct a sequence of experimentation plans, can be applied
to prove Proposition 5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider first n. The larger the agent’s stakes and/or
the lower c, the stronger is his incentive to engage (further) in experimentation at any
history ht. Hence, if he continues experimentation if U/c = U ′/c′ at a particular history
ht, then he does so if U/c = U ′′/c′′. Consequently, the maximum standard of evidence
that the agent is willing to provide is weakly higher.
Consider next n. Consider U ′/c′ and U ′′/c′′, with U ′′/c′′ > U ′/c′. Due to Propo-
sition 5, the probability that s = 1 conditional on reaching one of the histories in
Hs(P ∗(n∗, U ′′/c′′)) is lower than the probability that s = 1 conditional on reaching one
of the histories in Hs(P ∗(n∗, U ′/c′)), where P ∗(n∗, U/c) is the optimal experimentation
plan given n∗ and U/c. Hence, the lowest standard of evidence that persuades the de-
cision maker is weakly higher, the higher U/c. Q.E.D.
Derivation of a possible barrier to new methods. Consider two experimentation
technologies 1 and 2, with p1 < p2. Suppose upon observing an experimental outcome,
the decision maker knows with which experimentation technology it was generated. We
show that there are parameter constellations such that technology 1 can be used to
persuade the decision maker, but technology 2 cannot be used to persuade the decision
maker.
We prove the claim by construction. Assume that only one argument can be transmitted
to the decision maker, i.e., N = 1. Let pd < p1, such that the decision maker can be
persuaded if the agent stops experimenting unsuccessfully after the first failed trial
using technology 1. Suppose that c1 > 2p1(1 − p1)U , such that the agent indeed stops
experimenting after the first failed trial. Suppose further that c1 < U/2 such that the
agent has an incentive to engage in experimentation. Hence, an equilibrium in which
the agent persuades the decision maker with an argument acquired with technology 1
exists. If c2 < U(1 − p2), the agent does not stop the search for a favorable argument
with technology 2 until he has obtained one if the decision maker can be persuaded by
such an argument. Hence, he obtains such an argument with probability one in either
state of the world, such that it does not have an informational value. No equilibrium
with a standard of evidence n∗ = 1 exists.
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